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committed. 6 This power is conferred upon him by the Constitution
and cannot be limited by statute or decision.17 It does not have the
retroactive effect of determining whether the judgment was erroneous.' 8 The highest court of the state, in deciding that the legislative
branch could not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive, in the person of either the President or Governor, did not intend
to hold that the Executive could blot out a solemn record of the judicial branch of the Government. 9 Consequently, in the instant case, a
pardon which is granted by the President because he is satisfied that
the convicted person is innocent, has no retroactive effect on the judgment of conviction which has not been set aside nor reversed by the
judicial department. The pardon merely takes away the penalty directly attaching to the offense. It does not destroy the fact that the
crime was committed nor that the person had been convicted of it.20
Perhaps the legislature should declare by statute that a pardon should
state the reason for which it is granted, and that it should have the
effect of relieving the convicted person from further punishment and
from all other legal consequences of the crime. But it should not
absolve a party from guilt unless the pardon was granted on the
ground of innocence. 21
S.L.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-ToRTs-LIABILITY OF CITY FOR
ASSAULT BY EMPLOYEE IN CHARGE OF REPAIRING STREET.-Plain-

tiff drove down a street in Brooklyn in a freshly painted truck. The
street was being repaired by the city and there remained for vehicular
traffic a narrow portion, above which were overhanging branches,
likely to scratch plaintiff's truck. There were no warning notices or
barriers, at the intersections to the street, indicating that there were
any obstructions to be encountered. The defendant, Sisto, in charge
of the group doing the repair work, ordered plaintiff to proceed under
the branches. When plaintiff refused, Sisto attempted to enter the
U8Ez parte Campion, 79 Neb. 364, 112 N. W. 585 (1907); People v.

Larkman, 137 Misc. 446, 244 N. Y. Supp. 431 (1930).
17 Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) ; People ex rel. Page
v. Brophy, 248 App. Div. 309, 289 N. Y. Supp. 362 (4th Dep't 1936), app.

dis 'd, 277 N. Y. 673, 14 N. E. 384 (1938).

18 Roberts v. State, 30 App. Div. 106, 51

N. Y.

Supp. 691 (3d Dep't 1898).

19 Itre Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (1878) ; Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217,
54 N. E. 678 (1899) ; Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div. 425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493
(1st Dept 1923); People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 19, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528
(1917) ; People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't

1913).20

People ex re. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468
(1941);
People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1917).
21
Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon (1939)

88 PENN. L. Rav. 177.
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truck by force for the purpose of driving it himself, and upon encountering resistance, struck plaintiff with a shovel. In an action brought
against Sisto and the municipality for damages for assault, the plaintiff had won on trial but the Appellate Division reversed. On this
appeal, held, judgment of Appellate Division reversed. A municipality is responsible in damages for assault by its employee, when the
latter acts within the scope of his authority. A city employee in charge
of a group of men engaged in repairing the street has authority to
regulate traffic on the street over which he has control. It is at least
a question for the jury to determine whether the employee acted
within the scope of his authority. The fact that the assault was
willful does not preclude recovery of damages against the city.
Osipoff vs. City of New York, 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. (2d) 646

(1941).
At common law a private action did not ordinarily lie against a
public corporation for negligent performance of any public duty imposed upon it by statute, unless such corporation received some profit
in consideration of the duty.1 Nor would an action lie for the personal tort of any of its officers or agents in performance of such public
duty.2 Today, however, municipal corporations fall within the general rule that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the
negligence of his agent, occurring in the course of his employment.
However, to create such liability it is necessary that the act done
which is injurious to others be within the scope of the corporate
powers, as prescribed by charter or statute; it must not be ultra
vires.3 Sisto was in command of a portion of the public highway
which his master was obligated to keep reasonably safe for traffic.
Therefore Sisto was clothed with authority to direct plaintiff on the
street and to compel compliance by all lawful means. It was at least
a question of fact for the jury whether Sisto attempted to drive plaintiff's truck in order that he might not be compelled to move the city
trucks and thus lose time in doing the repair work. 4 That the act
was willful does not preclude recovery. Formerly, it was thought
that a corporation being an artificial person could not act from malice,
or have malicious or other intent, and therefore could not be liable
for a tort which required a motive and intention.0

It is now well

I Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 II. 494, 101 N. E. 96, 45 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1167 (1913).
2 Board of Park Commissioners of City of Louisville v. Prinz, 32 Ky. 359,
105 S. W. 948 (1907).

32
DILLoN, MuxicIPAL CoaRoRaAoxs (4th ed.) 968.
4
The question of whether the act of the servant is within the scope of the
master's business is, as every question of fact, a question for the jury, if the
evidence is in conflict or if conflicting inferences can be reasonably drawn.
EDGAR AND EDaa, LAw or ToRTs (3d ed.) 81; Craven v. Bloomingdale, 171
N. Y.
439, 64 N. E. 169 (1902).
5
Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 (1878), reaffd in Muller v.
Hillenbrand, 227 N. Y. 448, 125 N. E. 808 (1920); BuRMcx, LAw oF TORTS
(4th ed.) 183.
6In the early case of Vanderbilt v. Richmond Co., 2 N. Y. 479, 51 Am.
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settled, however, that a corporation may be liable for a tort or wrongful act of its officer or agent, although the wrongful act is dependent
upon motive, intent or malice. 7 The master will be responsible for
the acts of the servant which were within the general scope of his
employment, while engaged in his master's business, and done with
a view toward furthering that business, whether the act be done negligently, wantonly or even willfully.8 The principle of immunity of
municipal corporations can find no justification in sound social policy
and is one that is productive of great injustice and hardship to individuals with but slight advantage to society. Loss and damage inflicted in the course of the operation of governmental institutions
ought obviously to be counted in the cost of government and carried
by society rather than that unfortunate individual upon whom the
loss accidentally falls.
R.K.

NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT-ENFORCEMENT

AND RE-

VIEW OF ORDERs-APLICATION TO ADDUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
-In August, 1938, the petitioner, a Texas corporation, was ordered
by the National Labor Relations Board to cease and desist from unfair labor practices 1 and to take certain affirmative action.2 In June,
1939, the petitioner entered into a written stipulation with the Board
agreeing to obey the order except in so far as it related to back pay,
and the Board in turn agreed to accept such performance as suffiDec. 315 (1847), it was held that a corporation is not liable for a tortious act
committed willfully and maliciously by its servant, even though it was done
under orders from the president and general manager.
7 White v. International Textbook Co., 173 Iowa 192, 155 N. W. 298
(1915).
8 Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 (1878) ; Doscher v. Superior
Fire Proof Door and Sash Co., 221 App. Div. 63, 222 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1st
Dep't 1927).
1 Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act defines unfair labor practices by the employer. See 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp.
1941).
2 The order of the Board required the petitioner to cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Oil Workers International Union, Local No.
227, or in any other labor organization, by discharging its employees or by
otherwise discriminating in regard to employment. (b) In any other manner
interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
of self-organization, labor union membership, collective bargaining, etc. as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The affirmative directions of the order
were: (a) Offer to reinstate three employees found to have been discriminatorily discharged. (b) Pay them back pay for the period from the time of
discharge to date of reinstatement, less earnings during such period. (c) Post
appropriate notices at its Texas City refinery where the alleged unfair labor
practices had been committed.

